Structural, efficiency and income effects of direct payments: an analysis of different payment schemes for the German region 'Hohenlohe' by Kathrin Happe et al.
Structural, efficiency and income effects of direct payments: 





a & Kellermann, K.
 a 
a Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO),  
Halle (Saale), Germany 




The objective of this paper is to work out some fundamental dynamic effects on agricultural structure, 
farm incomes, and efficiency that result from decoupled income payments, the transfer of payments 
together with a progressive payment cut. To do so, we apply the agent-based model AgriPoliS (Agri-
cultural Policy Simulator). AgriPoliS is a normative spatial and dynamic model of regional agricul-
tural structures that takes account of actions and interactions between a large number of individually 
acting farms. The model is calibrated to the region 'Hohenlohe' in Baden-Württemberg which is char-
acterised by intensive livestock farming on the plains and extensive cattle and dairy farming in more 
remote valleys. The policy simulations show that impacts on structural change, competitiveness, and 
income distribution vary greatly depending on how the policy scheme is implemented. If direct pay-
ments are completely decoupled from land use (no obligation to farm land) this has significant and 
lasting effects on the competitiveness of agriculture, structural change, farmers’ incomes and land-
use.  
JEL-Classification: C63, R14, Q18 1 Introduction 
 
The current discussion on the mid-term review of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 
the EU has drawn much attention to the further decoupling of direct payments from produc-
tion. The proposed policy change is to provide a basis for the forthcoming WTO negotiations, 
but also for the enlargement of the EU. Since it is expected that an application of the Agenda 
2000 policies to the accession countries would create enormous budget pressure (Swinbank 
and Tangermann 2000), a less costly CAP is needed. The mid-term review of the CAP has 
provided a first proposal for such a policy change (EU Commission 2002). A key issue is the 
introduction of a farm specific decoupled income payment instead of payments coupled to 
production. This is expected to give the farms greater flexibility and to increase their market 
orientation. Among agricultural economists it is less the decoupling as such which is dis-
cussed, but it is rather the details of decoupled payments which are open to dispute. Among 
others, some critical points in this respect are: (i) a step-wise payment cut (dynamic modula-
tion), (ii) the establishment of payment entitlements per hectare, and (iii) the transfer of pay-
ment entitlements when parts of the farm are sold or leased. This paper aims to shed some 
light on these points. The objective is to work out some fundamental dynamic effects on agri-
cultural structure, farm incomes, and production efficiency that result from a switch to further 
decoupled income payment schemes and related detailed regulations. For this the agent-based 
model AgriPoliS (Agricultural Policy Simulator) is applied. AgriPoliS is a normative spatial 
and dynamic model of agricultural structures. The model explicitly takes account of actions 
and interactions (e.g. rental activities, investments, and continuation of farming) of a large 
number of individually acting farm-agents. Accordingly, AgriPoliS allows for endogenous 
structural change and it is particularly suited to analyse structural, allocative, and distributive 
effects of policy changes on the agricultural structure of a small region. In this study, the 
model is applied to the region of Hohenlohe in southwest Germany 
  22  Methods and techniques 
 
In AgriPoliS the farms are modelled as agents, i.e. as entities that act individually, and sense 
parts of their environment and act upon it (cf. Ferber 1999). As the main features of agent-
based models have been described elsewhere (e.g. Berger 2001, Balmann 1995 and 1997) we 
will not further elaborate on them, but focus on those model components that go beyond the 
basic model by Balmann (1995 and 1997).1 
 
In AgriPoliS an agricultural region is interpreted as a GIS-like grid of cells with a size of 2.5 
ha (Figure 1). The coloured cells represent agricultural land which is either grassland or arable 
land. On some of the cells, farmsteads are located. They are marked with and X. The total 
land of a farm consists of both own and leased land. All cells belonging to one farm have the 
same colour; if the land is owned by a farm, the cell is surrounded by a box. 
                                                 
1 A more detailed technical model documentation is available from the authors. 
  3 
Figure 1: AgriPoliS - Graphical User Interface 
 
We assume that each farm acts autonomously and maximises household income. For the ad-
aptation of the model to the Hohenlohe region we defined a number of production activities. 
The chosen 13 activities (pig fattening, pig breeding, turkeys, dairy cows, beef cattle, suckler 
cows, cereals, sugar beet, rape seed, and permanent grassland) are typical for the region. For 
production, farms can choose between 29 investment options (buildings, machinery, facilities) 
of different types and capacities. The latter allows to implement economies of size, i.e. with 
increasing size, the costs per unit of production capacity decrease and labour is assumed to be 
used more effectively. Farms can lease land, production quotas, and manure disposal rights. 
Labour can be hired on a fixed or per-hour basis, vice versa farm family labour can equally be 
offered for off-farm employment. To finance farm activities, farms can take up long-term and 
short-term credits. Liquid assets not used on-farm can be saved. Farms quit production either 
if they are illiquid or if opportunity costs of input owned by the farmer are not covered. 
  4Production and investment decisions are made simultaneously on the basis of a single-period 
mixed-integer programme. Farm decision making can be called myopic or boundedly rational 
because the decision problem of the model farms is highly simplified with respect to strategic 
aspects. Unbounded rationality would require that farms take account of the interactions be-
tween farms as well as of the technical and political framework conditions now and in future 
periods. Currently, this cannot be implemented because of computational and methodological 
problems.
2 Hence, we need to make a number of assumptions about expectation formation. In 
the majority of cases farms follow adapted expectations. Merely policy changes are antici-
pated one period in advance and included into the decision making process. If a policy change 
is expected to cause severe structural effects on key variables (e.g. a drop of land rental prices 
due to fully decoupled direct payments) then expectations about the respective variables (e.g. 
rents) are given exogenously. Furthermore, most prices remain relatively constant. Prices of 
livestock and cereals underly a slight downward trend, prices of variable labour and agri-
services are assumed to show a slow, but steady increase. 
 
New investments affect production capacities for the operating lifetime of the investment. 
Investment outlays are assumed to be totally sunk. Farms are handed over to the next genera-
tion every 25th period. For this decision opportunity costs of farm family labour are consid-
ered to be 15% higher. Accordingly, continuation of farming can be interpreted as an invest-
ment decision into either agricultural or non-agricultural training. And finally, farms are dif-
ferentiated by their management ability. For this we randomly assign each farm a manage-
ment factor which represents the spread of profitability and compatibility of model farms. 
 
At the start-up the location of farmsteads as well as the farms' initial endowment with produc-
tion factors (family labour, machinery, buildings, production facilities, land, production quota, 
                                                 
2 For instance, there may not be a unique analytical solution to such a complex decision problem. 
  5liquid assets, and borrowed capital) are specified. During the following periods these vari-
ables are changed as a result of production, lease, and investment activities. Even though 
farms do not directly interact with each other, they are connected indirectly via markets for 
products, land, milk quota, and manure disposal area.  
 
The land market is of particular relevance as farms cannot grow independently of land. As 
farms predominantly grow by leasing land, we only consider a land rental market. On this 
market, land is available either because farms quit the sector or because unprofitable land is 
let for lease. Each period, free plots are leased to the farms in an iterative auction. For this, 
each farm determines the plot it wishes to lease and determines a bid depending on the 
shadow price for land, the number of adjacent farm plots and the distance-dependent transport 
costs between the farmstead and the plot.
3 The number of adjacent plots and the bid are posi-
tively correlated because we assume that economies of size in crop production can be realised 
with larger field sizes and larger machinery. Finally, the bids of all farms are compared and 
the farm with the highest bid receives the respective plot. This process continues until all land 
is leased or the bids are zero. The renting process alternates between arable land and grass-
land. As other costs associated with leasing land, such as taxes and fees, are not considered in 
the initial bid, the actual rent paid is set at 75% of the bid. Each period the rent paid for a plot 
is adjusted towards the average rent paid for newly leased plots. This is done to avoid large 
fluctuations of rents between periods and to take account of trends. 
 
Technical change is another issue in AgriPoliS. On farms, technical change is mostly embod-
ied in process innovations, i.e. in improved equipments, facilities, or work organisation (cf. 
Berger 2001). With process innovations farmers usually expect to realise cost savings. As 
                                                 
t  
3 As shadow prices for land can possibly increase with land endowment, it would be reasonable to bid for more 
han one plot at a time. This poses computational difficulties, though. Therefore, in addition to the shadow price 
  6farms are highly heterogeneous in reality, it is hardly possible to determine an exact cost-
saving effect. Hence, we assume that with each new investment the variable unit costs of the 
product produced with the investment type decrease by 1 to 1.5 %. The labour saving feature 
of larger investments, also represents a kind of technical change.  
 
3  Model calibration and empirical data base 
 
The definition of the individual farm agents in AgriPoliS is mainly based on farm accoun-
tancy data from 1997/98 for 12 selected farms in Hohenlohe.
4 The chosen farms are consid-
ered to be typical for the region, i.e. they cover the most important production activities and 
organisational forms of the region. Table 1 provides an overview about key characteristics of 
the selected farms. Eight full-time and four part-time farms were chosen. Unfortunately, no 
data is available on the kind and the remaining useful lifetime of the farms' production 
equipment. Therefore, we assume that the farms operate with buildings, machinery and facili-
ties which are considered to be typical for the region.
5 In addition to the figures in the table, 
equity capital, land assets, and private withdrawals are also taken from accounting data. Based 
on these real farms, 12 model farming systems are defined. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
for only one plot we calculate the average shadow price for renting 8 plots at a time, and take the maximum of 
both as the basis for the rent offer. 
4 An adaptation to the financial year 1998/99 appeared not suitable because of the extremely unfavourable situa-
tion on pig markets. Currently the data base is adjusted to the financial year 2000/01. 
5 These were asked from the respective agricultural administration in the region. 
  7Table 1: Key characteristics and frequencies of the chosen farms (financial year 1997/98) 
 
  A B C D E F  G  H  I  J  K L 
Organisation                  
  Farm  type  PP  PP  D D A A  M  PP  D M  A PP 
 Full-time/Part-time  FT FT FT FT FT FT  FT  FT  PT PT  PT PT 
Land [ha]                  
  total    22,5 72,5 67,5 30  35  60  50  112,5  12,5 17.5  10  20 
 Leased  15 67,5  55 10 10 45  20  92,5 5  0  0  0 
  Arable  land  22,5 72,5 40  12,5 35  60  22,5  102,5  5  12.5  10  20 
  Grassland  0  0  27,5 17,5 -  -  27,5  10  7,5  5  0  0 
Family labour  1  1.7  1.38 0.99 1.15 2.27  1.53  1.8  0.72 0.71  0.26 1.16 
Milk quota [1000 t]  - - 203  100  - -  139  -  56  -  - - 
Livestock [places]                  
  Beef  cattle  - - - - - -  -  25 - 5  - - 
 Dairy  cows  -  -  39 26 -  -  28  -  12 -  -  - 
  Sows  40  128  - - 40  -  64  170  - -  - 128 
  Fattening  pigs  300  600  - - - -  -  -  - 100  - - 
  Turkeys  - - - - - 20000  -  -  - -  - - 
Frequency  480  25  120  244  106  22  231  95  389  154  442  298 
FT – Full-time; PT – Part-time; PP – Pig/Poultry; A – Arable; F – Dairy; M – Mixed 
 
 
The database underlying these farming systems is calibrated to reflect production capacities 
and key economic figures of the 12 real farms. Data on prices, production costs, and technical 
coefficients are taken from standardised data collections which were published for certain 
regions or the whole of Germany (e.g. KTBL). After calibrating the database on the farm sys-
tem level, in a final step the region is calibrated to reflect major key characteristics of the real 
region. For this, each model farming system is assigned a specific frequency (Table 1) which 
is the number of times this particular farming system is represented in the region. The fre-
quency was determined taking into account the total number of farms in the region differenti-
ated by size, farm type, land use, and livestock production.
6 The adaptation of the model to 
the real region was done by minimising the weighted quadratic deviation between selected 
figures of the model and of reality (cf. Balmann et al. 1998). With respect to a number of 
variables, the model matches reality quite well. For instance, in the model full-time farms 
manage 55,565 ha land, in reality it is 57,464 ha.
7 As for the number of farms of a particular 
type, the adjustment is worse; whereas in the model the number of arable farms is overesti-
mated by 25%, the number of mixed farms is underestimated by 24%. About 50% of the 
farms in the region are part-time farms, where as in the model about 25% of the farms are 
                                                 
6 Kleingarn (2002) provides a more detailed description of the data base and the calibration procedure. 
7 A more detailed table that compares the model adjustment to reality can be obtained from the authors. 
  8part-time farms. The reason behind is that very small farms are underrepresented in the under-
lying statistical sample. This makes it difficult to properly represent part-time farms. In a final 
step, the some 2600 model farms which are based on the different farming systems are further 





The following simulations illustrate possible dynamic effects of several decoupled payment 
schemes on the Hohenlohe region. The full implementation of Agenda 2000 by the end of 
2002 is taken as the reference scenario. However, as the model data base is derived from fi-
nancial years before the implementation of Agenda 2000, in a first step the model needs to be 
calibrated to a pre-Agenda policy situation. This is necessary since adjustment processes to 
policy changes are not immediate, but are slow and subject to a kind of path dependence 
(Balmann 1995).
8 In this paper the policy options as given in Table 2 are considered: 
 
Figures 2(a) and (b) show the development of the average farm size and of average sales 
revenue over time. This and the following figures show results for four periods prior and 15 
periods after the policy change.
9 The figures give an impression about the speed of structural 
change under the defined policy conditions. As the figures show, structural change takes place 
in all policy scenarios, but is more pronounced if payments are fully decoupled from produc-
tion and land use. This is underlined by figure 3 in which the reference scenario is contrasted 
with two decoupled scenarios. It shows that only in the case of a fully decoupled payment, 
land is increasingly managed by farms with 50 hectares or more. Coupling the payments to 
farmed land even slows down structural change as compared to the reference scenario.  
                                                 
8 In another paper, the authors undertake a detailed calibration of the basic model and compare the pre-Agenda 
and Agenda 2000 simulations and check the results for their plausibility. This analysis is available on request. 
  9Table 2: Policy scenarios* 
 
REF Agenda  2000"  -  Full implementation of Agenda 2000 at the end of 2002 
I Payment  entitlement 
per ha
# 
-  Each farm receives a single decoupled income payment based on the average 
payments of the past three years. 
-  The overall amount is split into parts (payment entitlements) on a per-ha-
basis. Hence, payments are attached to the use of land rather than produc-
tion. 
-  Entitlements are fully transferred if land is leased or let for lease. 
II Fully  decoupled 
payment 
-  Each farm receives a single decoupled income payment based on the average 
payments of the past three years. 
-  Payments are independent of farm activity, i.e. they continue to be granted if 
farms quit agriculture. 
III Decoupled  payment 
+ area payment 50 
€/ha 
-  Each farm receives a single decoupled income payment based on the average 
payments of the past three years. This payment is reduced by 50 €/ha of the 
average land farmed in the three years prior to the introduction of the policy. 
-  Cultivated land receives a basic area payment of 50 €/ha which is a reward 
for the land management activity. 
-  The decoupled payment part of the scheme is independent of farm activity, 
i.e. it is paid if farms quit agriculture. 
IV Decoupled  payment 
+ area payment 50 
€/ha + modulation 
-  Like the previous scenario 
-  The decoupled payment is decreased annually by 5% of the initial payment 
over the next 20 periods 
* Set-aside is compulsory; the dairy regime remains unchanged; premium payments for dairy cows are not considered. 
# This scenario is based on a specific interpretation of the EU commissions’ mid-term review of the Agenda 2000. 
 


























































Figure 2: Average farm size and average sales revenue  
 
Figure 2 also shows a clear difference between policy scenarios with respect to the way in 
which farms grow. In the reference scenario and scenario I farm acreage grows quicker than 
farm revenues. This means that over time production becomes less intensive.
10 In the decoup-
                                                                                                                                                          
9 Period 1 stands for the first period after the policy change. 
10 Extensification is also the result of a slight decrease (less than 1% p.a.) of some product prices over time. 
  10led scenarios, production is more intensive as both revenue and farm size grow at similar 
pace. However, in these scenarios, fully decoupled direct payments are not the only reason for 
a more pronounced farm size and revenue growth. Many smaller farms take the fully decoup-
led payments with a continuation of payments as a chance to quit production altogether. This 
changes the composition of the farm sample and therefore creates a sample effect. 
 
What cannot be seen in the figures is that in scenario II with fully decoupled income pay-
ments, in the model up to a third of all land (mainly grassland) in the region is not leased at all 
after the policy change. The introduction of a mixed policy, that on the one hand grants a fully 
decoupled income payment but at the same time rewards land use with a small base premium 
of 50 € per ha ensures that all land is farmed. 
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Figure 3: Development of farm size classes for selected policy scenarios 
 
As was indicated before, agricultural policies do not only affect the farm structure of a region 
but also the production structure. Table 3 shows the average annual change rates of selected 
production activities after a policy change. Compared to the reference scenario, suckler cow 
production ceases immediately after the introduction of payments which are decoupled from 
  11livestock production.
11 Dairy production also shows a steady decrease which is ore or less 
independent of the prevailing policy environment. Although this leads to falling quota prices, 
this effect is outweighed by the fact that dairy farms do not re-invest in dairy production or 
quit farming altogether. Intensive livestock production is more dependent on the policy envi-
ronment. Whereas in the reference scenario, pig production decreases, this could be reversed 
or slowed down in the decoupled scenarios II-IV. A reason for this is the easier accessibility 
of land due to lower rents. This alleviates manure restrictions. 
 
Table 3: Average annual change rates of production capacities for marketed products 
 
Szenarios REF  I  II  III  IV 
 [%] 
Cereals 0.56 0.80  0.73  0.81  0.81 
Sugar beet  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Dairy cows  -9.44 -9.71  -11.4  -9.38  -9.54 
Suckler cows
1) 3.43 .  .  .  . 
Fattening pigs  -0.51 0.78  2.40  2.41  2.07 
Breeding sows
2) -2.41 -1.34  -2.07  -1.71  -1.62 
Turkeys 1.51 1.43  4.37  2.52  3.00 
1) suckler cow production immediately stops after a policy change 
2) production of sows and fattening pigs is not linked  
 
In spite of decreasing total revenues in the region, the efficiency of agricultural production, 
measured as the difference between net value added and opportunity costs of labour and capi-
tal, increases significantly in all policy scenarios (Figure 4).  
 
                                                 
11 With respect to suckler cows one needs to be careful because profitability strongly depends on the way it is 
marketed. It is therefore difficult to correctly model suckler cow production in a linear programming model. 
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*The economic rent is what is left to pay for land. It is defined as total income plus rent expenditure minus opportunity costs of labour 
and capital. Depreciations of facilities that are used no longer when a farm quits the sector are not considered.  
 

















With farms leaving the sector the composition of the farm sample changes and the surviving 
farms take advantage of relaxed conditions on product and factor markets, and particularly on 
the land market. As Figure 4 shows, albeit an increasing average economic rent (Figure 4a), 
the average rent paid by the farms for leased land (Figure 4b) decreases. With respect to the 
fully decoupled scenarios, rents decrease dramatically by about 50 % shortly after the policy 
change. This shows, that the lower shadow prices for arable land and grassland resulting from 
decoupled payments are transferred quickly into lower rents.
12 As at the outset of the model 
the share of leased land is about 60% on average, farms with a higher share of leased land will 
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Agricultural profits - quartiles and average




















* By agricultural profits we denote the income stemming from agriculture excluding off-farm activity and farm family labour. 
 









On average, the agricultural profits, i.e. the income derived from agricultural activities includ-
ing transfer payments, show a much stronger increase in the decoupled payment scenarios. 
Even if direct payments are cut annually (scenario IV), profits increase faster than in the sce-
narios with payments attached to production or land use. This means that decoupling on aver-
age generates a growth potential which outweighs the reduction of direct payments. However, 
a look at the averages for the upper and lower quartiles of farms reveals that only in the sce-
nario with fully decoupled payments all farms benefit. In the other decoupled scenarios only 
the more profitable farms benefit. One could argue that this interpretation is also the result of 
the sample effect as the composition of the farm sample changes over time and depending on 
the policy. However, an analysis of the farms that survive under all policy conditions (Figure 
5b) shows that these farms can generate increasing profits in any case and even if payments 
are cut annually. Hence, farms with a growth potential high enough to guarantee the farm 
business to operate also in 15 year's time, benefit the most from decoupled payments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
H  
12 In reality this process can be expected to last longer as lease contracts usually define a period of cancellation. 
owever, it has to be noticed that rental contracts often include clauses that allow for the adjustment of rent 
  145 Conclusions 
 
The results obtained with AgriPoliS are subject to a number of assumptions that influence the 
behaviour and interactions of farm agents, and hence model results. Especially since the pre-
sented results imply relatively clear conclusions which, to our knowledge, cannot yet be re-
produced with other models, the approach behind AgriPoliS as well as the underlying as-
sumptions need to be discussed thoroughly. As long as comparable models are lacking, results 
can only be evaluated along their theoretical and practical plausibility. In brief, the central 
results of the policy simulations are: 
 
•  If payments are no longer attached to production, but to land use only (scenario I), this 
will result in no significant changes of production, efficiency, and profits compared to 
the reference scenario. This is not surprising as at least the cereal payments under the 
Agenda 2000 are considerably attached to land use and widely uniform.13  
•  Fully decoupled direct payment schemes granted independent of agricultural produc-
tion (scenarios II-IV) show to have land slide effects. Shadow prices for production 
factors fall dramatically as a consequence of the policy. Thus, farms have stronger in-
centives to spend less on leasing land, and to look for alternative uses of the comple-
mentary factors labour and capital. This means accelerating structural change. How-
ever, marginal land may no longer be managed. In the model, a basic land manage-
ment premium of 50 € per ha was enough to prevent land from falling idle.  
•  As for the winners and losers of a policy change towards decoupled income payments, 
the model results produce a clear answer. Both, unprofitable farms, and farms with a 
growth potential, profit from fully decoupled payments. The first group profits be-
cause they are rewarded for leaving the sector. This takes away some strain on the 
                                                                                                                                                          
payments to reflect changes in overall supply and demand on the land market.  
  15land market as more land is available for lease. The remaining farms have the oppor-
tunity to lease land at lower prices and to realise size effects more easily. Furthermore, 
as these farms' share of leased land has already been higher at initialisation, farms re-
ceive an additional profit from the sharp drop in rents.  
•  As was seen above, in the model, the resulting efficiency gains outweigh the disadvan-
tages from an annual payment cut. Hence, decoupling could be seen as a means to re-
duce the total amount of payments without suffering from severe income losses. The 
income effect on farms leaving the sector will have to be analysed further as these 
farms are excluded from the growth potential of remaining farms.  
•  Losers of a fully decoupled payment scheme will certainly be the land owners, as it 
can be expected that a drop in rents will also lower the sales value of land. This, how-
ever, has also consequences for the use of land as a security, which in return could en-
danger the survival of capital intensive farms, too. Moreover, it would make it more 
difficult for farms to exploit the very growth potential that results from the decoupling. 
 
The majority of the points are plausible from a theoretical and empirical point of view. How-
ever, there remain a number of questions, which cannot be answered to a full extent here. As 
much as fully decoupled payments granted independent of farming make sense from an eco-
nomic point of view, their general acceptance by society can be questioned as it will be diffi-
cult to justify why farmers should still receive payments if they quit farming (Swinbank and 
Tangermann 2000). Food quality and environmental aspects which form another pillar of ag-
ricultural policy making have also been left out. But it can be expected that these policies 
have an indirect effect on agricultural structures and production efficiency, too. From a purely 
economic point of view the results presented in this paper support the demand for a decoup-
ling of payments which over the past 25 years has repeatedly been advocated by agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                          
1
 
3 In the model this result is also due to the chosen algorithm on the land market. Free plots are chosen on the 
  16economists (e.g. Koester and Tangermann 1976, Swinbank and Tangermann 2000, Isermeyer 
2002). If implemented at reasonable financial terms and time horizons, and if certainty about 
the future existence of the policy scheme is insured, then a decoupled payment scheme could 
provide a chance for both policy makers and active farmers to win in the end. 
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